Tag Archives: history

No New Zealanders allowed

So if you aren’t in New Zealand or Hawaii you probably haven’t heard that 2 naval frigates from New Zealand have been forced to moor at a commercial dock in Hawaii rather than at the military  facility at Pearl Harbour. The reason is that a law New Zealand passed in 1987 banned nuclear power and weapons from our fair shores. Because the US Navy would neither confirm or deny that individual vessels had nuclear weapons or nuclear material onboard, it effectively banned US naval ships from New Zealand, ending the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) alliance. In retaliation New Zealand vessels aren’t allowed to moor with other countries’ vessels at Pearl Harbour during the world’s largest naval exercise, RimPac. I don’t think anyone in New Zealand cares that we have to park our 2 little ships away from the big boys. We certainly aren’t going to give up our nuclear free stance over it.

I also don’t think that many people anywhere else would care that New Zealand is not moored with other navies, and I think plenty would support our nuclear free stance anyway, especially in the wake of the Fukushima incident. The US’s actions in this case miss the point of the whole situation, like that movie:


These are a few of my favourite names

Okay, so names are important in international politics. Different countries call geographical features different things to suit their own ends – take the Persian Arabian Islamic Gulf as an example. Then there are the disputes over the names of nations themselves, as in the case of the Republic of Macedonia, which when it was admitted to the UN had to be called the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia so as not to piss off Greece and Greek Macedonians. Then there are names in certain languages that get transliterated into English one way and then changed to another, like Peking/Beijing or Mumbai/Bombay, while in other cases the choice of when to accept local spellings and when not is weirdly ambiguous. I follow football and it always strikes me as odd that the team from the Bavarian city of Munich known as Bayern Munchen in German is rendered as Bayern Munich in English. Why? Shouldn’t it be Bayern Munchen or Bavaria Munich?

There is also the highly politicised argument about what to call various categories of nations based on their economies and politics. The old 1st world, 2nd world, 3rd world system lost its middle category at the end of the Cold War but is still commonly used. The “West” is a term often used to mean rich countries with a strong European influence on their politics but if that includes the North American and Australasian states then it pretty much encircles the globe so it is west of everything, including itself. The now popular term “Global South” for poorer countries is equally stupid in my opinion as I happen to live in the most southerly capital city in the world and I daresay my country is richer than say Afghanistan, Mongolia, or Haiti in the northern hemisphere, to name a few. I’d guess that Australians, and Brazilians feel the same way as well. The categories of “developed” and “developing” are too value-laden for a lot of people, as are industrialised and industrialising and unindustrialised so there isn’t really a way I know of to name these categories satisfactorily. Nonetheless I’m pretty sure there are at least some categorical differences between countries like Sudan, Congo and Somalia, and Sweden, Switzerland and Monaco.

Having established that names can be important, I think it’s also good to enjoy them for their merits. Not everything has to be a big serious issue all the time. Here’s a few of my favourites, with the reasons why I like them:

Anyone else have any favourite names? Or have I just out-geeked everyone?


Can we please drop the debate about religion causing war?

The whole religion causes violence (and specifically large-scale violence between social groups, or war) argument has always irritated me because it implies that it is somehow possible to separate the religious aspect of one’s identity from the rest of that identity. I don’t deny that the way in which people represent their place in the world and their relationships to the rest of humanity can lead to violence and conflict, but I don’t think there is anything special about religion in this context. Granted that religion is often a massive part of identities which become part of the justification for war, for instance in the Balkans, but the few hundred years of secular society we have to draw examples from don’t exactly indicate that non-religious identities are less prone to violence. People of the same religion also often fight each other, and these conflicts can also shape the identities of the groups involved. For example, just look at the way in which the 200th anniversary of the War of 1812 – a war between two nominally secular and predominantly Protestant nations – was recently celebrated (yeah, celebrating war is fine apparently).

Like democratic peace theory (which I wrote about here) the religion causes war argument often relies on defining terms so that they suit the proponent’s position. For example, Stalin is often presented as someone who have killed in the name of atheism as a counterexample to people killing in the name of religion. Atheists dispute this by either arguing that he wasn’t actually atheist, or that he killed in the name of communism not atheism. However Marxist-Leninism as an ideology is explicitly atheist – so killing priests and bishops is not just a political action against the power of the church but an action to free the people from the shackles of religious thought. A more nuanced argument is that in this context Stalin’s ideology is effectively a religion, but this smacks of a circular argument – religious ideology causes violence so if your ideology is violent it must be religious,  even if you explicitly say it is anti-religious. Another sort of argument which is like those used to defend democratic peace theory is to list all the horrific acts in history which could be called “religious” and say “look, there’s way more of these than secular or atheist ones” while not acknowledging that from a historical perspective the extent of secular/atheist thought is miniscule so of course there are less examples to draw on.

Another point which I don’t see raised often in these arguments is the place of those cases where religion causes peace.When I was researching my Masters thesis in Bougainville for instance I often heard from people there about the vital role church groups played in bringing warring factions together to negotiate peace terms. This was in a conflict which was sparked by resources and ethno-nationalism and later became a complex mix of inter-tribal violence, but where all concerned parties were Christian, and even where they were different sects of Christianity that meant nothing in the context of the war there. Other examples are the Latin American Council of Churches being actively involved in peace programmes in Colombia and Guatemala, Desmond Tutu in Apartheid and post-Apartheid South Africa, Muslim peace activists in America, and the work of conflict negotiator, academic, and Christian, John Paul Lederach. I could go on, but I’m guessing you’ve got the point now. Religious doctrine can just as easily lead to peace as war, so why focus on the negative side of it?

I recently perused some parts of a book called “The Myth of Religious Violence” by a Christian theologian called William T Cavanaugh. I enjoyed what I read because it articulated a lot of ideas I personally had about this subject. For a start he talks about how hard it is to define religion anyway, and that before the enlightenment the dichotomy between religious and secular did not exist and thus all arguments must be made in the context of Western thought from the enlightenment onwards, and then he goes on to argue that the debate about religion causing violence serves to legitimate the violence used by secular Western governments while deligitimating the violence used by other, non-secular groups (specifically Muslims). An article by him here summarises the book quite nicely. Here’s quote from it:

The myth of religious violence helps create a blind spot about the violence of the putatively secular nation-state. We like to believe that the liberal state arose to make peace between warring religious factions. Today, the Western liberal state is charged with the burden of creating peace in the face of the cruel religious fanaticism of the Muslim world. The myth of religious violence promotes a dichotomy between us in the secular West who are rational and peacemaking, and them, the hordes of violent religious fanatics in the Muslim world. Their violence is religious, and therefore irrational and divisive. Our violence, on the other hand, is rational, peacemaking, and necessary. Regrettably, we find ourselves forced to bomb them into the higher rationality.

I don’t deny that people who are explicitly religious sometimes commit violence for explicitly religious reasons, but to say that religious thought leads to violence, or even that religious worldviews have a tendency to be more violent than secular ones, is to take very complex sets of data and find the conclusion that you wanted. This is especially true when talking about large-scale violence or war – such events are the outcome of many different factors which include the  geographical, the historical, and the socio-cultural. Identity undeniably plays a huge part in this and for much of the world religion is a crucial part of identity, so of course we would expect it to be called upon as a reason for violence. However to focus only upon the religious aspects of identity is to obscure the deeper questions about how and why certain groups feel the need to commit violence against others.

By constantly rehashing the debate about the link between religion and war we risk discounting other factors from our explanations of violence at large scales. At a practical level too, the constant promotion of the idea that religion leads to war may risk excluding religious groups from negotiating peace terms and working towards reconciliation between conflicting factions. Finally, it risks creating a new framework where secularism, and to a lesser extent atheism, becomes something which because it is considered more peaceful can be violently promoted around the globe. Please, can we just drop this debate? There is no obvious clear link and the search for one is dangerously distorting of the way in which we view humanity, by splitting it into the enlightened, peaceful atheists and the deluded violent theists.Even if this is not what atheists are seeking to do such oppositional thinking will only serve to fuel fundamentalism as it aims to defend itself against the perceived attack of secularism.

If people really want to help create a more peaceful world they should seek to develop a social space where all beliefs and identities are respected and included, and where violence is condemned no matter what the cause. To say that any belief system is better than any other not only smacks of cultural imperialism but also just serves to deepen divisions and create more conflict.

Note: In case you’re wondering I don’t identify as either atheist or religious.


My theory on why the USSR collapsed

Ever had to deal with a government department to sort out your taxes, get a driver’s license etc? Notice how frustrating and annoying the paper-pushing process is? Now think about a whole country where everything you do goes through that process….

Exactly.

NB: Before anyone thinks I’m a crazed anarcho-capitalist or something, I’m not against the government providing social welfare, healthcare, etc. I don’t think the free market can provide those things well enough for all citizens, so dealing with government bureaucracy is a necessary evil sometimes. But a whole country like that? Yikes!


Complexity and chaos in international relations theory

I haven’t blogged for a while because of stupid crap (like life) getting in the way. However now I’m back with a rambling musing on the underlying nature of the system of states and institutions which constitute international relations. My apologies if this gets a bit hard to follow but these ideas are still forming in my mind so I might not be able to articulate them brilliantly yet. Still, writing them down might help me make sense of them myself.

So the starting point of what I’m thinking about is the constituent parts of the international order, which is to say nation-states. If a nation is an ethnic group sharing a common history, language, and cultural traditions and a state (in this context) is a formal political entity exercising control and a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its territory, then a nation-state is simply a state which contains a nation and represents their interest. Of course, in reality there are very few examples of culturally homogenous nation-states – maybe San Marino is an example – but in practice what seems to happen is that a state helps to reinforce a sense of nationhood amongst its citizens and the two aspects of the nation-state evolve in a complex interplay with each other.  The lure of nationalism is still immensely strong even among people who don’t think they are nationalists. Everyone identifies to some extent with the culture(s) they grew up in and this shapes how they view the world. One doesn’t have to want to conquer other countries or kill some hated foe to be a nationalist, as Michael Billig pointed out in his book “Banal Nationalism”.

National myths develop based upon how the state itself  developed, or as statehood becomes the ultimate goal for ethnic minorities in larger nation-states. The national myth of the USA, for example, is based upon the ideas of freedom and liberty, and developed both because some early colonisers were persecuted religious minorities and because the revolution which saw it secede from Britain has been framed as an attempt to break chains of bondage to the crown. Later the abolition of slavery was awkwardly integrated in, but the place of the Native Americans within the national myth has never been worked out because immigration and escape from persecution are essential parts of what it means to be America, and the Native Americans do not fit this narrative. Individual cultural groups of Native Americans like the Sioux are nations without a state, not a part of the nation-state in which they live. Meanwhile, in other parts of the world states simply fail to survive or develop, and the people that live in these areas end up effectively being excluded from economic and political activity which takes place on a global scale.

The creation of a robust idea of a nation-state is therefore a complicated and messy process decided in part by historical events and geography, and reinforced by the behaviour of itself, its citizens, and other states. I personally feel that history is a vital part of understanding international relations, perhaps because I have studied it a lot. For instance it is impossible to understand the current state of the Israel-Palestine conflict without understanding its history. At an even deeper level, the history of the nation-state as a concept and how it spread around the world are vital subjects to understanding how nation-states operate today. I won’t go into this too much here (because this post will be huge anyway) but it is important to note that it developed out of war and struggles for dominance in Europe and was exported around the world by European colonialism, coercion and influence. Interestingly Europe was also the first part of the world to really try to develop something beyond the nation-state (the EU) at an inter-state level, and the resulting clusterf*ck and rising nationalist fervour in Europe today look set to bury that little experiment. The Eurozone crisis also shows the crucial place of economics in the study of international relations. States influence economies and economies influence states and the two are effectively impossible to separate. While political science and economics may be approached quite distinctly by academics, they are really inextricably entwined in the real world. However, while these big things all influence state behaviour so can “little” things as well: the personalities of the states’ leaders, or the price of food, or even someone’s decision to stop for a sandwich.

Essentially what I’ve been gearing up to say over those last couple of paragraphs is that international relations is an extremely messy and complex subject, where a wide range of factors interact to produce the eventual outcome. This is a defining characteristic of all social sciences and social scientists often try to develop theories to simplify their explanations of these outcomes but I’m not sure that works often enough, at least in international relations (I haven’t studied other social sciences enough to really comment on them). I am willing to concede that part of my thinking on this may be the result of how my brain works – I think I naturally think inductively not deductively –  but I am confident enough in this view to say that no conventional international relations theory will ever fully explain state behaviour. There is however a theoretical  framework out there which while it may lack the ability to predict state behaviour, it can explain much of it. This is what is called either chaos theory or complexity theory, and it was developed to explain complex systems which are highly sensitive to their initial conditions. I think international relations is just such a system, and the application of chaos theory can help explain certain aspects of it. I am definitely not the first to think this: here is an article on it which looks like it could be interesting, and here is another. In fact a quick search around throws up an impressive number of articles on the subject of chaos and/or complexity in international relations. I haven’t actually read any of them though! (Although I will soon, once I have the time. I promise. Really…)

The point is that it seems like a few people are thinking the same way. It will be interesting to see if these ideas ever take hold at the heart of international relations scholarship or if they are left as the domain for the lunatic fringe. Obviously all explanations of complex systems can only focus on certain aspects and necessarily simplify or exclude certain things, and I am not deluding myself into thinking that the application of chaos theory to international relations will be some sort of final destination in the search for full understanding. However, it is interesting to consider what it can add to the debates of the discipline – for instance, a description of nation-states as strange attractors could explain why they are so resilient to external forces like globalisation and internal forces like shifting demographics. Anyway, these are just my thoughts on the subject for now. Maybe when I actually read some of those articles I will change my mind!


Good riddance, democratic peace theory

I’ve never had much time for the democratic peace theory. It strikes me as empirically suspect, overly simplistic, and ethnocentric. Now it looks like the spread of democracy itself will finally put an end to this nice but rather naive idea.

Put simply this theory states that democracies will not engage in war with each other and was most famously proposed by one of those Wise Dead White Men, Immanuel Kant, in 1795. In the last couple of decades it has gained in popularity despite some rather obvious flaws. While I think that there may be something to the proposition that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other than non-democracies the evidence for this is still not conclusive, and the idea that they don’t at all has already been disproven. I would suggest that over the next decade or two the democratic peace theory will be so openly refuted that it will no longer be a tenable position. The reason for this is simply the increasing number of democracies in the world.

It is important to point out that there are already several counter-examples to the democratic peace theory but these are usually cast aside by the argument that the countries involved aren’t actually democracies – the so-called “no true Scotsman” fallacy. Here’s a list of wars between democracies, and although the “not a real democracy” argument might hold for some (or most) of them, by narrowing the definition of democracy so much the proponents of democratic peace theory reduce the size of the statistical sample so much that their own conclusions can no longer escape being called a statistical anomaly, or explained away by other means. For instance, the vast majority of democracies are for historical reasons based in areas of European cultural heritage – Europe itself, North America, and Australasia, or what is commonly referred to as the West – and when countries outside of this implement democracy it is often taken to be “not a true democracy.” However an explanation of why these Western democracies have not engaged in war with each other (except for Britain declaring war on Finland during WWII… oops, don’t mention that!) could just as easily be their shared cultural backgrounds and the mutual interests they hold which significantly reduce the chance of war between them.

Now that more and more countries are becoming democracies counterexamples of the democratic peace theory will become more common too.  The obvious place to look for this is the Middle East – Egypt is in transition to becoming democratic and it  at least seems possible that something similar may happen in Syria in the future.  All that has to occur than is a conflict between one or both of these states and Israel and there is yet another example of democracies going to war with each other. Of course Palestine holds elections too, so there is already an ongoing conflict between Israel and another democracy, not to mention the tensions with Lebanon which is also a democracy. What these cases show is that when two democracies do not have mutual interests and view themselves in completely different ways then the fact they are democracies does not prevent them from fighting each other. As more states become democratic the number of states with contested borders or other reasons for disputes who both happen to be democracies will increase.

Having said all this, it is possible that being a democracy reduces the chance of conflict with other democracies but generating statistical proof of such a proposition means accounting for variables such as culture and mutual interests which are inherently qualitative. International relations is not a subject which is suited to statistical/quantitative analysis for this very reason.

Democracy is still a desirable goal for a whole bunch of reasons, but claiming that democratising the world will end conflict is just plain wrong. Trying to defend the democratic peace theory on the basis that counterexamples are not true democracies is pure ethnocentrism. Effectively it is saying that only Western powers are true democracies, and that they are somehow superior to other democracies from other parts of the world while ignoring such obvious problems with their own political systems as the shambles of the 2000 US Presidential Election. Clearly this is bulsh*t. Without the “no true democracy” argument democratic peace theory really doesn’t stand up, so can we please forget about it now?